03 On Hidden Logics of Culture

What are the broader implications of Malinowski’s argument that “Natives” cannot perceive the underlying functions of our own cultural practices? How does this claim reconcile with the work of Jomo Kenyatta, a “native” anthropologist and Malinowski’s mentee?

The logical extension of these arguments is that what we think and say about our culture is different from its “real” meanings. If, as Benedict and Malinowksi argue, it’s hard for us to even perceive these real meanings, how can we gauge the veracity and helpfulness of these theories? What are the political and methodological implications of a hidden universality of culture?

Think with the example of “gifting” as a behavior that has underlying, often unperceived, social functions. Does this interpretation of gifting rob gift exchange of its sentimental value? What about other social behaviors – generosity, conspicuous consumption, romance, and sex – that can be anthropologically explained as functional? How can we reconcile competing interpretations of these practices?